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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (“NCAA”) AND THE CURRENT
ECONOMIC REALITIES OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
“In the court of public opinion, the [NCAA] has been on trial
for quite some time now.” 1 Much of the public’s disdain for the
NCAA is fueled by the fact that big-time 2 intercollegiate athletics
now generate billions of dollars each year, 3 while the studentathletes that produce the revenues are subject to strict rules of
amateurism that restrict their compensation and force them to
“live hand to mouth.” 4
Despite almost constant calls for change, the NCAA has
stubbornly adhered to its principles of amateurism as justification
for the prohibition on student-athlete compensation. As a result,
everyone involved in big-time college sports is getting rich, except
the student-athletes whose labor creates the value. 5 This
seemingly fundamental unfairness has caused tensions to rise
within intercollegiate athletics and spawned an unprecedented
number of antitrust challenges against the NCAA in recent years. 6
*J.D. Candidate 2016, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
1 Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against
the NCAA, N.Y. TIMES, (June 9, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-edobannons-suit-against-the-ncaa.html?_r=0.
2 For the purposes of this Comment, “big-time” college sports will refer to
football and men’s Basketball on the Division I level.
3 See William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: Northwestern University,
a New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014) (providing
financial records regarding the revenues and expenses of the NCAA). The
NCAA reported revenues of $912,804,046.00 in 2012-13. Id. “[T]elevision and
marketing rights fees” generate most of that revenue. Id. The rest is generated
from various sources: championships and tournaments - $110,631,867.00;
investment income - $41,398,750.00; sales and services - $27,307,562.00; and
contributions from facilities - $7,074,007.00. Id.
4 See Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 2014)
available
at
www.economist.com/news/united-states/21612160-pressuregrows-let-student-athletes-share-fruits-their-own-labours-players-0
(stating
that while college coaches receive millions of dollars a year, “the best players
live hand to mouth”).
5 See infra Part II(D).
6 See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335-38 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming
dismissal of a claim challenging NCAA rules on the number of athletic
scholarships a school can offer and the prohibition of multi-year scholarships);
see also Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1026-27 (S.D. Ind. 2013)
(dismissing claim regarding scholarship restriction at the Division III level);
Eben Novy-Williams, NCAA 2nd-Quarter Lobbying Costs Surge as Antitrust
Lawsuits Loom, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 13, 2014, 11:00 AM),
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-13/ncaa-2nd-quarter-lobbying-costs-surgeas-antitrust-lawsuits-loom.html (stating that because of the pending antitrust
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This Comment will analyze the historical application of antitrust
laws to the rules and regulations of the NCAA and argue that, in
light of a recent shift in judicial treatment, the next round of
antitrust litigation threatens to destroy the entire NCAA model. 7
This Comment will then demonstrate that while reform of the
current NCAA model is long overdue, destroying the entire system
through antitrust litigation is not the ideal solution because such a
result would actually create more problems than it would resolve.8
Instead, this comment proposes that any pressure to reform
should come directly from Congress, in the form of NCAA Reform
Legislation. This legislation would provide the NCAA with a
strictly enforced, qualified exemption to federal antitrust laws that
would allow the NCAA to implement actual, meaningful reform,
while promulgating certain rules and restrictions that
traditionally would have been vulnerable to antitrust challenges.

II. NCAA REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Formation
Athletics

and

Evolution

of

Intercollegiate

The scope and complexity of intercollegiate athletics have
changed drastically over the last 100 years. 9 When college
students first started forming athletic teams in the midnineteenth century, the student-athletes organized and controlled
the competitions themselves. 10 As the popularity and complexity of
intercollegiate athletics grew in the late nineteenth century, this
system of student governance proved to be unsuitable. 11 Problems
with increasing commercialization and cheating during sporting
contests led colleges and universities to assume governance of
intercollegiate athletics. 12 For example, the nation’s very first
suits against the NCAA, the organization is spending more money than ever
before on congressional lobbying).
7 See infra Parts III & IV.
8 See infra Part IV(B).
9 Christian Dennie, Changing the Game: the Litigation That May Be the
Catalyst for Change in Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 16
(2012); Jeffrey J.R. Sundram, Comment, The Downside of Success: How
Increased Commercialism Could Cost the NCAA its Biggest Antitrust Defense,
85 TUL. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010). See also JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA:
THE NCAA'S FIRST CENTURY 9-19 (2006) (discussing the impetus behind the
formation, and the subsequent evolution, of the NCAA).
10 See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association's Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 9, 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter Smith 1] (discussing the early years of
intercollegiate athletics and the forces that led to the formation of the NCAA).
11 Id.
12 Id. In fact, the very first intercollegiate athletic event, a competition
between the rowing teams at Yale and Harvard in 1852, demonstrated the
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organized athletic conference – the Big Ten - was formed in 1895
by a group of Midwestern institutions that were simply looking to
gain more control over intercollegiate sporting events and studentathletes. 13
Historians have noted that “[d]espite the shift from student
control to faculty oversight . . . intercollegiate athletics remained
under-regulated and a source of substantial concern.” 14 Concerns
regarding the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics were
compounded by worries over the violence and brutality of college
football. 15 In 1905 alone, at least eighteen players died playing
college football. 16 The rules of the game and the style of play led to
much of the violence: “[p]layer substitutions were not allowed,
brawls were tolerated and the ball carrier was allowed to crawl
along the ground until finally held down.” 17 Brutal injuries became
commonplace. 18 As a result, the public urged institutions to reform
football, or have it abolished. 19
In response, President Theodore Roosevelt gathered some of
the nation’s top intercollegiate athletic leaders in Washington,
D.C. to discuss reform and urge sweeping changes. 20 As a result of
problems with these issues. Id. at 10-11. The event was sponsored by a
prominent regional railroad looking to increase traffic on a new route that led
to the lake where the contest was held. Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A
Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic
Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 840 (2014).
13 See Mark Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny:
Why a Win for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports, 92 OR. L.
REV. 1019, 1023 (2014) (discussing the formation of the earliest athletic
conferences). The group called themselves the Intercollegiate Conference of
Faculty Representatives. Id. In 1899, the group expanded to nine teams and
called themselves “the Big Nine Conference.” Id. at 1024. When the
conference added a tenth team in 1917, “the Big Ten” was born. Id.
14 Smith 1, supra note 10, at 12.
15 Id.
16 See Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
Death Penalty: How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J.
985, 990 (1987) [hereinafter Smith 2] (stating that eighteen college football
players died in 1905 alone); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS:
COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 8 (2001)
(estimating that 330 players died playing college football from 1890-1905).
17 Amy Ellis Nutt, How Brutal Injuries Plagued College Football Long
Before the Concussion Debate, NJ.COM (Dec. 15, 2013, 12:04 AM),
www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/12/how_brutal_injuries_plagued_college_foot
ball_long_before_the_concussion_debate.html.
18 See id. (presenting a list of injuries tallied by an observer during a
Princeton University football game: “four concussions, three ‘kicks in the
head,’ three serious spine injuries, a ruptured intestine, seven broken collar
bones, four broken noses, three broken shoulder blades, ‘two eyes gouged out,’
one player bitten and another knocked unconscious — three times — in just
one game”).
19 Dennie, supra note 9, at 16.
20 Drew N. Goodwin, Not Quite Filling The Gap: Why the Miscellaneous
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these meetings, sixty-two colleges and universities joined together
in forming the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
States (IAAUS). 21 The group changed its name to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910, and the NCAA was born. 22
Early in its existence, the NCAA played only a small role in
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 23 Essentially, the
organization served as a “discussion group that developed rules
applicable to intercollegiate athletics.” 24 Two of the NCAA’s most
notable early proposals involved allowing the forward pass, and
adding the first-down marker in college football, thereby opening
up the playing field and reducing player injuries. 25 “With the
NCAA serving in this limited capacity, collegiate athletics thrived
in the first half of the twentieth century.” 26 Schools started
building enormous stadiums to meet the needs of their fan bases, 27
and college football players began to gain celebrity status. 28
As public interest in college sports continued to grow, the
NCAA began searching for ways to increase integrity in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. 29 The NCAA adopted
certain eligibility rules and attempted to prevent the “financial
remuneration” of student-athletes. 30 These early restraints failed
to
have any meaningful effect because the NCAA had no
enforcement powers; compliance with NCAA rules was strictly
voluntary. 31 It became clear that reliance on voluntary compliance
was ineffective because of “the dramatic expansion of
intercollegiate athletics and the financial opportunities such
growth presented.” 32
Expense Allowance Leaves the NCAA Vulnerable to Antitrust Litigation, 54
B.C.L. REV. 1277, 1282 (2013).
21 Id.
22 Crowley, supra note 9, at 12.
23 Smith 1, supra note 10, at 13.
24 Dennie, supra note 9, at 16.
25 Edelman, supra note 13, at 1026.
26 Id.
27 See id. at 1027 (discussing the rapid growth of college football during the
1920s). For example, in 1922, Ohio State opened a 66,210-seat stadium that
quadrupled the capacity of the prior stadium. Id.
28 See id. (stating that Red Grange, one of the most famous college football
players of all time, received as much attention in the 1920s as Babe Ruth and
Charles Lindbergh).
29 See Smith 1, supra note 10, at 13 (discussing how the commercial
ramifications associated with winning led to the recruitment of college
athletes “being raised to new heights”).
30 See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 Or. L. Rev. 329, 331 [hereinafter
Lazaroff 1] (discussing some of the earliest regulations implemented by the
NCAA during the organization’s formative years).
31 See id. at 332 (explaining that the rise in popularity of college football
made actual enforcement of the NCAA rules as difficult as enforcing
prohibition).
32 Id.
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Despite these concerns, the NCAA was unable to develop any
meaningful enforcement mechanism until a few decades later. 33
With the advent of national television after World War II, college
sports experienced another large growth in popularity, 34 and, for
the first time, athletic departments became large revenue
generators. 35 “Money, usually tied to winning programs, became
the driving force in athletic departments,” and “[a]thlete recruiting
abuses, basketball scandals, and other distressing events reached
a peak.” 36 The need for institutional control and leadership became
clear, so the member-institutions authorized the NCAA to
undertake more enforcement powers. 37 This marked the first time
in the history of intercollegiate athletics that the NCAA obtained
broad authority to sanction wrongdoers for rules violations. 38
The NCAA’s role in the governance of intercollegiate athletics
has continued to evolve and expand since then. 39 Today, the NCAA
is “the dominant force in the presentation and regulation of
intercollegiate athletics.” 40 The organization currently supervises
eighty-nine championships in twenty-three officially sanctioned
sports, while monitoring more than 460,000 student-athletes
participating at almost 1,100 colleges and universities. 41 The
See Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1282 (discussing the NCAA’s
transformation into a “powerful regulatory body with full authority to police
and penalize member universities” during the 1950s).
34 Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted
Reform of Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779,
790 (2010). The relationship between intercollegiate athletics and television
began in 1938 when the University of Pennsylvania televised the first football
game. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984). According to sources,
there were six television sets in Philadelphia at that time, and they were all
tuned in to the game. Id. at 89 n.3. Ironically, the NCAA and its memberinstitutions were terrified of the impact that television would have on
attendance at college sporting events. Id. at 89-90. As a result, strict television
restrictions were put in place. Id. For example, under early television
agreements, only one college football game was broadcast in a certain area
each week; and in three of the ten weeks during the season there were
“blackouts” where no games would be shown at all. Id.
35 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 34, at 790.
36 Id.
37 Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1282.
38 Id.
39 See Lazaroff 1, supra note 30, at 333-35 (examining various attempts by
the NCAA to effectively enforce its regulations after being given the power to
do so).
40 Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy
or Letting the Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 229 (2014)
[hereinafter Lazaroff 2] (discussing whether the NCAA should be entitled to a
blanket exemption from federal antitrust laws enumerated in the Sherman
Act).
41 See NCAA, Who We Are, NCAA.ORG www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (discussing the general structure and organization of
the NCAA). The NCAA is divided into three Divisions of athletic competition:
DI,
DII,
and
DIII.
See
NCAA,
Membership,
NCAA.ORG
33
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NCAA rules over its vast empire by enforcing bylaws pertaining to
a wide variety of issues, such as “ethical conduct, amateurism,
recruiting, academic eligibility, and practice and playing
seasons.” 42

B. Regulating Intercollegiate
Principles of Amateurism

Athletics

through

the

Many of the NCAA’s core bylaws pertain to the rules of
amateurism, 43 which provide that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical,
mental, and social benefits to be derived. Student participation . . .
is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.” 44 As
such, the NCAA asserts that the organization must “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and . . . retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." 45
Essentially, NCAA amateurism means that student-athletes
are prohibited from receiving anything of “pecuniary value in
exchange for participating in college sports.” 46 Among other
restrictions, NCAA rules prohibit student-athletes from accepting
compensation in any form, 47 registering for a professional sports
www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-andhistory-multidivision-classification (discussing the NCAA’s multi-division
classification). Each Division has separate championships for its student
athletes and is subject to minor variations in certain rules and regulations. Id.
For example, student-athletes in Divisions I and II are allowed to receive
athletic scholarships, while Division III athletes cannot receive scholarships
based on athletic ability. Lynn O’Shaughnessy, Why Athletes Have an Edge at
Elite
Colleges,
CBS
NEWS
(June
2,
2009,
12:52
PM),
www.cbsnews.com/news/why-athletes-have-an-edge-at-elite-colleges/.
The
Institutions that comprise Division I usually “have the biggest student bodies,
manage the largest athletic budgets and offer the most generous number of
athletic scholarships.” NCAA, Division I: About the Division, NCAA.ORG,
www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
42 Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1284.
43 See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105
HARV. L. REV 1299 (1992) [hereinafter Harvard] (providing that the NCAA
regulates college sports through the implementation and enforcement of
various constitutional bylaws).
44 NCAA, Division I Manual, at §2.9. (Aug. 1, 2014), available at
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D115.pdf
[hereinafter Division I Manual].
45 Division I Manual, at §1.3.1.
46 Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and
Conflicting Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 274-75 (1994).
47 In addition to actual monetary compensation, student athletes are
prohibited from accepting promises for future payments following the
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league draft, or hiring an agent to represent them. 48 Studentathletes who violate these rules will forfeit their eligibility to
compete in NCAA sanctioned events and, in some instances,
subject their respective schools to severe punishment as well. 49
While all other forms of compensation are prohibited, the
NCAA does allow certain student-athletes to receive athletic
scholarships from their respective universities. 50 The bylaws
impose limits on athletic scholarships and “[f]or decades, studentathletes have been limited to a ‘full grant-in-aid,’ which [is
defined] as ‘financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and
board, and required course-related books.’” 51 Traditionally,
scholarship benefits for student-athletes have been capped at
conclusion of NCAA eligibility. Id. Student athletes are also prevented from
accepting compensation from the sale of any commercial product using their
names and likenesses. Id.
48 Id. at 306. It is worth noting that the NCAA does provide exceptions to
some of these rules, but they are very limited. For example, the Manual
provides an exception to the “no-draft” rule for men’s basketball players that
provides:
In men’s basketball, an enrolled student-athlete may enter a
professional league’s draft one time during his collegiate career
without jeopardizing eligibility in that sport, provided: . . .
(a) The student-athlete requests that
his name be removed from the draft list and declares his intent
to resume intercollegiate participation not later than the end of
the day before the first day of the spring National Letter of
Intent signing period for the applicable year;. . .
(b) The student-athlete’s declaration of intent is submitted in
writing to the institution’s director of athletics; and
(c) The student-athlete is not drafted.
Division I Manual, supra note 44, at §12.2.4.2.1.1.
49 See Davis, supra note 41, at 305 (discussing the ramifications for
violating NCAA amateurism rules). The history of the NCAA is filled with
stories of athletes violating the principles of amateurism and facing severe
consequences. See Top 10 Infamous NCAA Sanctions, REALCLEARSPORTS.COM
(May
17,
2013),
www.realclearsports.com/lists/infamous_ncaa_sanctions/smu_football.html
(listing ten of the most infamous scandals and severe sanctions the NCAA has
ever imposed on various intercollegiate athletics programs for major rule
violations); Ivan Maisel, The Games Can’t be Unplayed, ESPN.COM (June 6,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?id=5272888 (discussing the
scandal involving former University of Southern California star football
player, Reggie Bush, and how the university forfeited wins - and Bush his
Heisman trophy – after it was revealed Bush received improper benefits while
playing football at the school); David Whitford, SMU’s Death Penalty: The
Recruiting Scandal that Refuses to Die, FORTUNE.COM (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:00
PM),
http://fortune.com/2013/08/29/smus-death-penalty-the-recruitingscandal-that-refuses-to-die/, (addressing the formerly scandal-plagued
Southern Methodist University’s football program’s attempts to recover from
the one and only “death penalty” ever handed down to a college football
program by the NCAA).
50 Division I Manual, supra note 44, at § 15.1.
51 Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1284-85.
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amounts that the NCAA acknowledges fall several thousand
dollars short of the actual “cost of attendance.” 52

C. The Current Economic Realities of Commercialized
Intercollegiate Athletics vs. the Ideals of Amateurism
As the NCAA has evolved, the organization has “transformed
college athletics into a multibillion-dollar industry.” 53 As a result,
the NCAA, athletic conferences, individual member-institutions,
television networks, and others now reap exorbitant financial
benefits through their involvement with intercollegiate athletics. 54
However, benefits for student-athletes have not increased beyond
the value of their athletic scholarships. 55 As the money continues
to pour into big-time college sports, the NCAA finds itself “caught
in a huge contradiction” attempting to justify restrictions on
student-athlete compensation under the guise of amateurism. 56
A detailed look at the NCAA Division I men’s basketball
tournament offers a clear example of the current economic
52 See id. (discussing the differences between “grant-in-aid” and “cost of
attendance” financial aid). The NCAA has tried to address this “cost of
attendance issue” in the past. Michael Marot, NCAA’s Strongest Argument
Might be Cap Limit, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2014, 6:04 PM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/ncaas-strongest-argument-might-cap-214156026-spt.html. In 2011, the NCAA Board of Directors voted to allow an additional
stipend for student athletes that would close the cost of attendance gap. Id.
The rule change was voted down, however, by over 100 smaller member
institutions concerned with wealthier schools and programs gaining more
control and power. Id. More recently, on August 7, 2014, the NCAA Division I
Board of Directors voted to allow schools in the “Power Five” conferences to
have the authority to “change rules regarding, among other things, athlete
welfare.” Cameron Miller, A Timeline of Events from This Summer’s O’Bannon
Case, THE STANFORD DAILY: STANFORD UNIVERSITY (Sep. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter Miller 1]. This could potentially have implications in the future,
but the Power Five have not yet voted on any new benefits for athletes. Id.
53 Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1281. The NCAA reported revenues of
approximately $989 million in 2014. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped
$1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2015, 4:59 PM)
[hereinafter
Berkowitz
1],
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement2014-1-billion-revenue/70161386/. The NCAA reported expenses of
approximately $908.6 million, which includes $547.1 million that the NCAA
distributed to Division I schools and conferences. Id. Approximately 80 percent
of the organization’s revenues are generated from the sale of broadcasting and
marketing
rights.
NCAA
REVENUE
www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/finances/revenue (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
54 See Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1281 (stating that many of the entities
associated with intercollegiate athletics “have increased their profits
exponentially,” while student-athletes cannot receive anything beyond the
value of a scholarship).
55 Id.
56 D. Stanley Eitzen, Slaves of Big Time College Sports, USA TODAY, Sept.
2000, at 26.
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realities of intercollegiate athletics. 57 The season-ending
tournament, commonly referred to as “March Madness,” allows the
NCAA to showcase the country’s most talented Division I
basketball players, and is “extraordinarily lucrative for many of
those involved[.]” 58 The tournament is so valuable that, in 2010,
CBS paid the NCAA a staggering $10.8 billion to obtain the
exclusive broadcasting rights to March Madness for fourteen
years. 59 The agreement earned the NCAA $700 million in revenues
in 2014, and that number is projected to grow at a rate of about 3
percent per year for the duration of the agreement. 60 The massive
expenditure pays dividends for CBS because advertisers are
willing to pay the network as much as “$1.22 million for a thirtysecond opportunity to sell their products during the final game.” 61
The profits associated with March Madness are not limited to
the NCAA and television networks. Every win during the
tournament can earn a school – and each of its conference
members – as much as $1.5 million from the NCAA; and many
coaches have six-figure performance bonuses in their contracts,
which are triggered by March Madness wins. 62 None of the money
is shared with the student-athletes, however, because the rules of
amateurism provide that student-athlete participation is
“motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and
social benefits to be derived.” 63
March Madness provides just one example of the current
exploitive state of big-time college sports, and the NCAA is not the
only group reaping the benefits. As one critic puts it, “[e]veryone
associated with intercollegiate athletics is getting rich except the
people whose labor creates the value.” 64 In addition to the NCAA,
individual athletic conferences and member-institutions are now
earning unprecedented sums of money as well. 65 It is estimated
See Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A union of Amateurs: A Legal
Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 Buff. L. Rev. 1003, 100304 (describing March Madness and demonstrating that everyone involved in
the tournament reaps financial benefits except the student-athletes,
themselves).
58 Id. at 1003.
59 Id. See also Ben Klayman, NCAA Signs $10.8 Billion Basketball Tourney
TV Deal, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2010, 4:12 PM), www.reuters.com/
article/2010/04/22/us-basketball-ncaa-cbsturner-idUSTRE63L4FP20100422
(discussing the details of the NCAA’s fourteen-year contract with CBS to
broadcast March Madness each spring).
60 Berkowitz 1, supra note 53.
61 Fram & Frampton, supra note 57, at 1003.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1004. See also Division I Manual, supra note 44, at §2.9.
64 Dennie, supra note 9, at 38 (quoting Michael Lewis, Serfs of the Turf,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2007, at 4) (internal citation omitted)).
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/opinion/11lewis.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0
(internal citation omitted).
65 See Bill Fay, BCS Bowl Games Bad Business for Colleges, DEBT.ORG
57
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that athletic conferences and individual schools produce an
additional $6.1 billion annually through “ticket sales, radio and
television receipts, alumni contributions, guarantees, royalties and
NCAA distributions.” 66
Just like the NCAA, athletic conferences generate most of
their revenues by selling broadcasting rights to conference-specific
events. 67 All of the “Power 5 Conferences” 68 have contracts that
generate hundreds of millions of dollars each year. 69 The Big Ten,
for example, has contracts with multiple television networks that
produce colossal revenues each year. 70 These contracts include a
$1 billion agreement with ESPN that will produce $100 million per
year through 2017. 71 Additionally, the conference has granted
television rights to “the Big Ten Network” through 2032. 72 This
agreement will generate an additional $112 million per year for
the conference. 73 In addition to those two contracts, Fox pays the
conference $24.1 million per year just to obtain exclusive
broadcasting rights to one game - the Big Ten’s annual
championship football game. 74
Individual member-institutions are filling their coffers as
well. Last year, for example, the University of Texas’ athletic
department — the wealthiest in the country — generated a record

(Jan. 7, 2013), www.debt.org/blog/bcs-bowl-games-bad-business-for-colleges-2/
(discussing the logistics of the payouts and distributions of money earned from
participating in BCS bowl games). When schools from specific athletic
conferences play in a BCS bowl game, the entire conference splits the profits.
Id.
66 NCAA Revenue, supra note 53.
67 See Nitin Bhandari, The 10 Most Expensive College Sports TV Contracts,
THERICHEST.COM (Dec. 30, 2013), www.therichest.com/sports/the-10-mostexpensive-college-sports-tv-contracts/ (providing the financial details of the ten
most lucrative television contracts between networks, the NCAA, and the
power-five athletic conferences).
68 Collectively referred to as the “Power Five” conferences: SEC, Big Ten,
Big 12, ACC, PAC 12. See generally Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to
Allow Autonomy, ESPN.COM (Aug. 8, 2014), http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-powerconferences.
69 Bhandari, supra note 67. For example: the ACC generates $240 million
annually; The SEC earns $150 million annually; the PAC 12 earns $250
million annually; and the Big 12 earns $200 million annually. Id.
70 See id. (listing various agreements between the Big Ten and multiple
television networks).
71 Id.
72 The network is a joint venture between Fox and the Big Ten conference.
Id. The Big Ten Network is operated almost entirely by Fox, but the
conference maintains a 49 percent ownership share in the network. Id.
73 Id. Under these agreements, ESPN has “first tier” rights, meaning the
network gets first pick of certain games. Id. The Big Ten Network is allowed to
show more events, but must wait for ESPN to choose games first. Id.
74 Id.
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$165 million in revenue. 75 The school took an unprecedented step
recently when it launched its own television station, “the
Longhorn Network.” 76 The twenty-four hour network will be
dedicated solely to University of Texas athletics and will be
operated by ESPN. 77 Under the terms of the agreement, the school
is guaranteed to earn around $15 million per year over the next
twenty years. 78
The University of Texas’ athletic department is not an
anomaly. Many of the top athletic departments in the country,
such as Alabama, Michigan, and Ohio State, report annual
revenues well in excess of $100 million. 79 And because the schools
are not required to pay student-athletes, the skyrocketing
revenues are being directed towards coaches and lavish athletic
facilities in attempts to attract the best players and build winning
programs. 80
As a result, college coaching salaries have skyrocketed,
increasing 500 percent since the 1980s. 81 In 2012, the average pay
for a head coach at a school with a big-time college football
program was $1.64 million. 82 That amount marked a 12 percent
increase from the year before, and a 70 percent increase from
2006. 83 Similarly, the salaries of head coaches of Division I men’s
basketball programs increased 112 percent from 2005 through
2012. 84 The University of Alabama’s head football coach, Nick
Saban, will make $7.3 million this year, 85 while Mike Krzyzewski,
Gould et. al., supra note 3, at 18.
See Kristie Chong Adler, Time Warner Cable Launches Longhorn
Network, ESPN, ESPNMEDIAZONE.COM (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://espnmediazone.com/us/pressreleases/2013/08/time-warner-cablelaunches-longhorn-network/ (discussing the creation and launch of the
Longhorn Network).
77 Id.
78 Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1283.
79 Gould et al., supra note 3, at 18.
80 See Tom Farrey & Lester Munson, Expert: Money Flow Disproportionate,
ESPN.COM
(June
10,
2014),
http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/
id/11063471/ncaa-coaches-reaping-benefits-economist-testifies-obannonlawsuit (presenting the main arguments of an expert witness presented by the
plaintiffs in the O’Bannon case to demonstrate the disproportionate flow of
sports revenues harms competition and is, therefore, a violation of the
Sherman Act).
81 Id.
82 Pay Rises Yet Again for College Football’s New Coaching Hires, USA
TODAY (Jul. 1, 2013, 4:29 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/
2013/02/11/college-football-coach-salary-changes-ncaa/1907359/.
83 Id.
84 Barry Petchesky, No, Paying Athletes Won’t Bankrupt College Sports,
DEADSPIN (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:22 PM), http://deadspin.com/no-paying-athleteswont-bankrupt-college-sports-1502028351.
85 See Top 15 Highest Paid College Football Coaches, SPORTINGNEWS.COM
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015) www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2014-0624/top-15-highest-paid-college-football-coaches-nick-saban-charlie-strong-bob75
76
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head coach of the Duke men’s basketball team will receive $6
million. 86 To put NCAA coaching salaries into perspective,
consider that in forty states the highest paid public official is a
college football or college basketball coach. 87
High-ranking NCAA officials and university administrators
are also handsomely rewarded under the current system. NCAA
President, Mark Emmert, who has said that “it’s grossly
unacceptable and inappropriate to pay players” because doing so
would convert them from “students to employees,” 88 earned
approximately $2 million last year. 89 These large salaries for

stoops-urban-meyer-photos/ (breaking down the salaries of the highest paid
coaches in NCAA football).
86
See Steve Berkowitz, et al., NCCA Salaries, USA TODAY,
www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ncaab/coach/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2015) (providing a table of the highest basketball coaches in the NCAA). There
is so much money to be made in big-time college athletics that schools are even
willing to pay millions of dollars to make a “bad” coach go away. After the
Auburn University’s football team recorded one of its worst seasons on record
(the team limped to an unacceptable 3-9 record in 2011-12), head coach Gene
Chizik and each member of his staff were fired. Chris Smith, Auburn – Florida
State BCS Title Game Is Clash of Financial Giants, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2014,
12:59 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2014/01/06/auburn-florida-statebcs-title-game-is-clash-of-financial-giants/. The firings will force the university
to eat over $11 million dollars in contracts through the 2015-16 season. Id.
While coaches are fired regularly for poor performance, it is worth noting that
just two years before his termination, Chizik led Auburn University to a
National Championship and was rewarded with a lucrative, long-term
contract extension. Head Coach Gene Chizik Given Raise, Contract Extension,
AUBURNTIGERS.COM (June 10, 2011), www.auburntigers.com/sports/mfootbl/aub-m-footbl-body.html.
87 Edelman, supra note 13, at 1032. It must be noted that many NCAA
member institutions acknowledge the inherent problems with these exorbitant
coaching salaries and other expenditures and argue that they would like to be
able to provide more benefits to athletes, but are prohibited from doing so. See
Farrey & Munson, supra note 80 (discussing attempts by large schools and
conferences to provide more benefits to players, only to be denied by schools
that claim they cannot afford to provide more benefits). While discussing the
high revenues generated by football and basketball programs, the chancellor
of the University of Nebraska has said,
because of efforts to create ‘a level playing field’ we can spend
these resources in almost any way we want except to improve
support for student athletes. Too often, our efforts to improve
the lives of student athletes have been deflected because of cost
implications that are manageable by our institutions but not by
institutions with less resources.
Id.
88 Dennie, supra note 9, at 42.
89 Miles Hinson, The Valuation of Student Athletes, THE DAILY
PRINCETONIAN (Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://dailyprincetonian.com/
sports/2014/09/the-valuation-of-student-athletes/.
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administrators and coaches are only possible because the NCAA
and its member-institutions do not pay the workforce. 90
The NCAA has simply gone too far in relying on the principles
of amateurism as justification for not increasing the financial
benefits available to student-athletes. A recent study shows that
while the NCAA, athletic conferences, and universities earn
billions of dollars each year, more than 85 percent of scholarship
student-athletes live at a level below the poverty line because of
the strict rules of amateurism. 91 Numbers like this demonstrate
that NCAA reliance on the principles of amateurism is nothing
more than a “cynical justification for maintaining a lucrative
status quo.” 92 The NCAA and its member-institutions seem more
interested in generating revenues than protecting the needs of
student-athletes, even if it means blatantly breaking NCAA
bylaws to do so. Current ESPN analyst and former college
basketball star, Jay Bilas, a staunch critic of the NCAA, 93 exposed
an example of this last year via his Twitter account. 94 NCAA rules
have long prohibited any party from selling merchandise
associated with any individual player, including jerseys with a
player’s name on the back. 95 Despite this prohibition, the jerseys
produced and sold always correspond with the numbers of the
most notable players on each team. 96
The NCAA had always argued this was mere coincidence, but
Bilas was able to definitively disprove this contention by paying a
visit to the NCAA’s own website. 97 He went to the “NCAA Shop
Website” – ShopNCAASports.com – and entered specific players’
names into the search box provided. 98 Each time he searched for a
specific player, such as “Johnny Manziel,” the official website of the
NCAA would take him directly to a page displaying a jersey, from
that player’s team, bearing that player’s number, which could be
purchased at that time. 99
90 See Petchesky, supra note 84 (stating that an “eye-popping” amount of
money is paid to NCAA coaches because the NCAA does not have to pay a
workforce).
91 Edelman, supra note 13, at 1032.
92 Id.
93 See Experts: Political Move Could Help NCAA Avoid More Court Woes,
INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (Aug. 11, 2014), www.ibj.com/articles/48986-expertspolitical-move-could-help-ncaa-avoid-more-court-woes,
[hereinafter
IBJ]
(providing background on Jay Bilas and his views on NCAA hypocrisy).
94 Travis Waldron, ESPN’s Jay Bilas Exposes NCAA’s Hypocrisy on
Amateurism with Simple Web Search, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Aug. 7, 2013, 8:53
AM), http://thinkprogress.org/sports/2013/08/07/2425531/ncaa-removes-searchfunction-after-espns-jay-bilas-exposes-amateurism-myth/.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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Bilas posted the results of each search on his Twitter account
and, within days, the NCAA removed the “search” option from the
website. 100 Bilas’ postings incited so much public backlash that
NCAA President Mark Emmert released a statement saying the
NCAA would no longer sell athletes’ jerseys through its website
and that doing so in the first place was a “mistake.” 101 The NCAA’s
willingness to blatantly violate its own bylaws by selling the
jerseys of specific players to generate revenues provides a perfect
microcosm of the current state of big-time college sports. 102
Put simply, big-time college sports are driven by money, and
the NCAA has gone too far in relying on outdated traditions of
amateurism as justification for failing to share any of the wealth
with student athletes. 103 Fundamental inequities like this have
caused tensions to rise in intercollegiate athletics and studentathletes have begun to challenge the rules of the NCAA with
increased frequency. 104
Id.
See Jeff Eisenberg, Mark Emmert Acknowledges Hypocrisy of NCAA
Selling Jerseys, Insists it Will Stop, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:43 PM),
https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/ncaab-the-dagger/mark-emmert-acknowledgeshypocrisy-ncaa-selling-jerseys-insists-204322822.html (discussing the Jay
Bilas controversy and the NCAA’s decision to stop selling jerseys on its
website).
102 The total retail marketplace for college-licensed merchandise in 2013
was estimated at $4.59 billion. CLC Names Top Selling Universities,
LICENSEMAG.COM (Aug. 7, 2014), www.licensemag.com/license-global/clcnames-top-selling-universities. The Collegiate Licensing Company represents
the NCAA and nearly 200 of the nation’s top colleges and universities by
protecting, developing, and promoting their individual brands. See generally
About CLC, CLC.COM, www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last visited Dec. 10,
2014). The CLC compiles lists of the top selling universities and
manufacturers each year and reports the information on its website. Id. The
fact that there are enough manufacturers and retailers earning money by
selling and producing NCAA merchandise that the CLC is able to produce lists
of the “Top-25 Non-Apparel Licenses, Top-25 Apparel Licenses, and Top-25
Local Licenses” demonstrates just how many people have their hands in the
pot and are earning money from the labor of NCAA student-athletes.
103 See David Davenport, Legal Cases are Blowing up the NCAA Big
Business Model – Why it Matters, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2014, 5:17 PM),
www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/08/11/legal-cases-are-blowing-upthe-ncaa-big-business-model-why-it-matters/ (discussing some of the NCAA’s
common defenses to antitrust claims and how the NCAA can no longer rely on
them given the current state of intercollegiate athletics).
104 See Richard T. Karcher, The Battle Outside of the Courtroom: Principles
of “Amateurism” v. Principles of Supply and Demand, 3 MISS. L. REV. 47, 75
(2013) (discussing the increased willingness of student-athletes to challenge
the NCAA “without fear of the repercussions”). The article refers to
amateurism as a “growing, indestructible immense ‘blob’ that is engulfing all
sorts of normal, moral, and legal activities” within intercollegiate athletics. Id.
See generally Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975)(upholding
rules against compensating athletes); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D.
Ariz. 1983) (ruling in favor of the NCAA regarding rules prohibiting post100
101
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Many have attempted to use the federal antitrust laws of the
Sherman Act as the vehicle to challenge the NCAA. 105

D. The Sherman Act: The Framework for Antitrust
Challenges Against the NCAA
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination. . ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce.” 106 The purpose of the Act is to thwart anticompetitive
economic practices that might otherwise reduce marketplace
efficiency and harm consumers. 107 Given the size and substantial
market power of the NCAA, “it should not be surprising that the
NCAA is no stranger to federal antitrust litigation.” 108 NCAA
member-institutions, coaches, student-athletes, and others have
challenged a wide variety of NCAA rules and regulations, alleging
that they amount to illegal restraints on trade under the Sherman
Act. 109 One observer has noted that certain NCAA rules, such as
those restricting student-athlete compensation, “can reasonably be
interpreted as the very antithesis to the type of competitive
markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman Act. 110
In analyzing antitrust challenges under Section I of the Act,
the Supreme Court has recognized that almost every binding
contract can be seen as a restraint of trade of some sort. 111
Therefore, the application of the Sherman Act is limited to
agreements that result in “unreasonable restraints of trade.” 112
Thus, a “rule of reason” test has developed as the default standard
for determining the reasonableness of a particular restraint. 113
The analysis requires a two-part test to determine whether a
season play); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (denying a
challenge to the NCAA’s “no-draft” rules).
105 See supra note 6.
106 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
107 Goodwin, supra note 20, at 1288.
108 Lazaroff 2, supra note 40, at 228-29.
109 Id. at 229.
110 Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law:
Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 61, 70 [hereinafter Antitrust Treatise].
111 See e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (stating that
the contract in that case could be seen as a restraint on trade in a sense that
every contract could be seen as a restraint on trade in some way).
112 Id. (stating that the Court has repeatedly recognized that the Sherman
Act “was intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade”).
113 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014). In addition
to this standard analysis, courts have also applied a “quick look” or “per se”
analysis when determining the reasonableness of a particular restraint. Id.
These standards will not be addressed herein as courts have been hesitant to
apply them in instances similar to the present “where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious.” Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (internal citation omitted)).
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Sherman Act violation has occurred. 114 First, “the plaintiff must
show that the action has a substantially adverse effect on
competition.” 115 If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant must then
demonstrate “any pro-competitive effects that could justify the
agreement.” 116 The court will then weigh each party’s showing in
determining whether the challenged agreement constitutes an
unreasonable restraint on trade. 117
Put simply, a challenged restraint will survive a rule of
reason analysis so long as any harm from the restriction does not
outweigh the restriction’s “pro-competitive effects.” 118 The
following section of this Comment will analyze the historical
application of the Sherman Act to antitrust challenges against the
NCAA and explain why judicial attitudes toward the NCAA’s
amateur model have changed drastically in recent years.

III. ANALYZING THE APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
TO THE NCAA’S TRADITIONS OF AMATEURISM
A. Historically, Judges Have Provided Great Deference to
NCAA Rules Involving Amateurism
Although there have been many antitrust suits against the
NCAA throughout the organization’s history, most have been
unsuccessful. 119 Courts have historically afforded great deference
to the NCAA and its traditions of amateurism. 120 In fact, courts
initially refused to apply the Sherman Act to any challenges
against the NCAA because courts viewed the activities of the
organization as non-commercial in nature. 121 As the nature of
intercollegiate athletics changed, courts began to slowly
acknowledge that commercial interests did motivate certain NCAA

114 Adam R. Schaefer, Recent Development: Slam Dunk: The Case for an
NCAA Antitrust Exemption, 83 N.C.L. Rev. 555, 557 (2005).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001).
119 Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of Big
Time College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th
Century Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century,
[hereinafter Mitten 2], 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
120 See Dennie, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the long-held view of most
courts that the NCAA needs ample latitude to play its “critical role in the
maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports”).
121 See Mitten 2, supra note 119, at 3 (citing Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp.
295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975)). Courts held that the rules and restrictions imposed
by the NCAA were not of a “commercial” nature and, therefore, did not even
trigger the rules of the Sherman Act. Id.

142

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:125

activities; but even then, courts remained reluctant to find that
any of those rules actually violated the Sherman Act. 122
Judicial deference towards the NCAA’s traditions of
amateurism can clearly be seen in the seminal NCAA antitrust
case of its time, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents. 123 Ironically, the NCAA
lost this case, but dicta from the Supreme Court’s opinion provided
the NCAA with fundamental antitrust defenses that the
organization and the courts would rely on for the next thirty years.
There, “the Supreme Court held that the NCAA does not have a
blanket exemption from the antitrust laws . . . because the ‘NCAA
and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize
revenues.’” 124 The Court applied this logic and invalidated NCAA
rules that prevented universities from selling the broadcasting
rights to their own football games. 125
Although the NCAA lost the case, the Court drew an
explicitly clear distinction between restrictions involving purely
commercial activities of the NCAA — such as brokering
broadcasting rights — and restrictions aimed at preserving the
traditions of amateurism. 126 In dicta, the majority “strongly
suggested that primarily noncommercial NCAA rules to preserve
amateurism, academic integrity, and competitive balance do not
violate the antitrust laws.” 127 The Court stated that “the NCAA
plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports” and the NCAA “needs ample
latitude to play that role.” 128 Although the case had nothing to do
with rules pertaining to student-athletes, the Court went as far as
to say that “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of
[amateur athletics], athletes must not be paid, must be required to
attend class, and the like.” 129
Subsequent court decisions relied on the Board of Regents
dicta and, generally, “rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA rules
by providing great deference and discretion to the NCAA.” 130 Since
then, certain NCAA restrictions pertaining to business activity

122 See id. (stating that despite the application of the Sherman Act to
certain rules involving the NCAA’s business activities, courts were still very
reluctant to hold the NCAA liable for violating antitrust laws) (citing Ass’n of
Intercollegiate Ath. for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977)).
123 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
124 Mitten 2, supra note 119, at 3 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101).
125 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88.
126 Id. at 120.
127 Mitten 2, supra note 119, at 4.
128 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added).
129 Id. at 102.
130 Mitten 2, supra note 119, at 4.
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have been declared antitrust violations, 131 but courts have
uniformly upheld any NCAA regulations relating specifically to
student-athlete eligibility and amateurism. 132

B. Judicial Treatment of the NCAA has Shifted and
Threatens the Organization like Never Before
“[T]he dynamics of intercollegiate athletics [have] changed
substantially” in recent years. 133 Commentators have noted that
courts are beginning to appreciate the vast commercialization of
big-time college sports and are no longer showing deference to
historical arguments based on the traditions of amateurism. 134
This shift in judicial treatment is exemplified by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals’ changing views of NCAA amateurism
over the last twenty years.
In a notorious case from 1992, Banks v. NCAA, the Seventh
Circuit provided great deference to NCAA amateurism rules in
denying a student-athlete’s antitrust challenge against the
NCAA. 135 There, a football player challenged the “no-draft” and
“no-agent” rules after being declared ineligible to play his senior
year because he consulted with an agent and declared for the NFL
draft following his junior season at Notre Dame. 136 The Banks
131 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1010 (holding that an NCAA rule that limited
coaching salaries for entry level Division I coaches was an unreasonable
restraint on trade under the Sherman Act).
132 See Mitten 2, supra note 119, at 5 (stating that since Board of Regents,
courts have treated regulations pertaining to student-athlete eligibility as
“virtually per se legal under the antitrust laws”); see also Banks v. NCAA, 977
F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “noagent” restrictions did not violate antitrust laws because they allowed the
NCAA to preserve the traditions of amateurism within college athletics); Rock,
928 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-27 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (dismissing claim regarding
scholarship restriction at the Division III level); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180,
187 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying challenges to rules that would not allow graduate
students to transfer and participate in a sport at a different school);
McCormack v. NCAA 845 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing a
challenge that the NCAA violated antitrust laws by promulgating and
enforcing rules that restricted the benefits and compensation that a studentathlete may receive).
133 See Dennie, supra note 9, at 22 (stating that although the NCAA has
fared favorably in the past by relying on the tradition of amateurism, courts
are less reluctant to intervene than they have been in the past); see also
Karcher, supra note 104, at 50-51 (arguing that judicial favor seems to be
shifting away from the NCAA’s model of amateurism).
134 Dennie, supra note 9, at 41. See also Karcher, supra note 104, at 50-51
(arguing that “[j]udges are giving less deference to the NCAA’s interpretation
of amateurism and how amateurism principles should apply to college
athletes”).
135 Banks, 977 F.2d 1081.
136 Id. Banks, a football player for the University of Notre Dame, was
declared ineligible because he registered for the National Football League
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court echoed the sentiment of the Board of Regents Court and
afforded deference to the NCAA, saying the restrictions were
necessary to preserve the traditions of amateurism. 137
In 2006, the court addressed a similar NCAA antitrust
challenge in Agnew v. NCAA. 138 There, multiple student-athletes
brought an antitrust challenge claiming that two NCAA bylaws,
“the cap on the number of scholarships given per team and the
prohibition of multi-year scholarships,” violated the rules of the
Sherman Act. 139 The case was dismissed on procedural grounds, 140
but it remains significant because the court presented a viewpoint
towards amateurism that was starkly different from its viewpoint
in Banks twenty years earlier. 141
While the court was quick to defend NCAA amateurism in
Banks, 142 the Agnew court felt that the NCAA needed to do more
than just baldly assert that a challenged restriction provided
procompetetive benefits to protect it from antitrust scrutiny. 143
The court did not think that the challenged bylaws were
“inherently or obviously necessary for the preservation of
amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general product of college
football,” as the NCAA argued. 144 To the court, the challenged
bylaws looked like methods to contain costs, not to preserve the
“product of college football.” 145 Furthermore, the Agnew court
(“NFL”) draft and consulted with an agent. Id. at 1083-84. Banks was barred
from playing in his senior year despite the fact that he was not drafted by an
NFL team and never received any compensation. Id. He then sued the NCAA
under the Sherman Act, arguing that the “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules
constituted unreasonable restraints on trade. Id.
137 Id. at 1089-90.
138 Agnew, 683 F.3d 328.
139 Id. at 332. The plaintiffs argued that the rules had clear anticompetitive effects on the market for student-athletes because, if the bylaws
had not been passed, schools would need to offer multi-year scholarships to
stay competitive in the market. Id. at 333.
140 See Darren Heitner, Rock and the Class v. NCAA: Does the NCAA
Violate Antitrust Law by Capping Scholarships?, SPORTINLAW.COM (Aug. 1,
2012),
http://sportinlaw.com/2012/08/01/rock-and-the-class-v-ncaa-does-thencaa-violate-antitrust-law-by-capping-scholarships/ (stating that the case was
dismissed at the district court level because the plaintiffs failed to establish
the “relevant market,” as is required to bring an action under the Sherman
Act). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision because of the failure in the
plaintiffs’ pleadings, but made it clear that the NCAA had done nothing to
justify why the rules were necessary. Id.
141 Karcher, supra note 104, at 51.
142 See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091 (stating that the challenged rules were
vital to preserve the amateur status of college athletics).
143 See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 346 (stating that simply because a challenged
restraint might have legitimate benefits within a given market, that “does not
remove that industry from the purview of the Sherman Act altogether”).
144 Heitner, supra note 140 (quoting Agnew, 683 F.3d at 344).
145 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 344. The court acknowledged the fact that the
NCAA may have been able to present evidence later in the proceeding that
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specifically referenced the Banks opinion and disagreed with some
of its main contentions. 146 Agnew may have been dismissed prior
to going to trial, but it remains significant because it clearly
demonstrated the court’s shifting opinion towards NCAA
amateurism. And, as evidenced below, these changing viewpoints
are not limited to the Seventh Circuit.
In another recent case, Oliver v. NCAA, 147 a college baseball
player challenged the NCAA’s “no-agent” rule. 148 Although this
challenge was brought under Ohio law, rather than the Sherman
Act, it remains relevant because of the court’s treatment of the
NCAA. In Oliver, the plaintiff asked the court to evaluate the
validity of the no-agent rule and enjoin the NCAA from continuing
to enforce it. 149 In its opinion, the Oliver court “chastised the
NCAA for its application of [the no-agent rule].” 150 The court felt
that rule “allows for exploitation of the student-athlete ‘by
professional and commercial enterprises,’” in contravention of the
NCAA’s stated intentions. 151 Following the decision, the NCAA
and Oliver agreed to settle the matter outside of court. 152 The
NCAA offered Oliver $750,000 and, in return, Oliver agreed to
vacate the order of the court invalidating the no-agent rule. As a
result, the no-agent rule “remains in full force and effect.” 153
The recent ruling in O’Bannon v. NCAA further demonstrates
the evolution of judicial treatment of NCAA amateurism. 154 In
2009, a group of former college basketball players, 155 led by former
demonstrated the necessity of the bylaws, but the NCAA had failed to do so at
that time. Id.
146 See id. at 346-47 (disagreeing with the legal arguments in Banks).
147 Oliver v. NCAA, 2009-Ohio-6587, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 920 N.E.2d 203,
vacated pursuant to settlement (Sept. 30, 2009).
148 Karcher, supra note 104, at 55.
149 See Dennie, supra note 9, at 29 (discussing the remedies sought by
Andy Oliver in his suit against the NCAA).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (holding that the NCAA violates
antitrust by not allowing them to share in revenues generated through sales of
merchandise using their names and likenesses). Ironically, the judge tasked
with issuing the decision is not even a sports fan. John Branch, Judge in
NCAA Case Known as Evenhanded, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/sports/judge-in-n-c-a-a-case-known-as-fair-andmodest.html?_r=0. When first confronted with the common abbreviation of the
Southeastern Conference, SEC (one of the major conferences in college
athletics), during the O’Bannon proceedings, she admitted that she
immediately thought of the Securities Exchange Commission, and not college
athletics. Id.
155 See Eder & Strauss, supra note 1 (stating that the list includes former
basketball greats Oscar Robertson and Bill Russell, along with many other
former and current players).
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UCLA All-American Ed O’Bannon, sued the NCAA. 156 They
alleged the NCAA violated the Sherman Act by using players’
names, images, and likenesses to promote and sell NCAA licensed
products without sharing the resulting profits with the players. 157
The NCAA presented some of its most common defenses at trial
and asserted that the compensation restrictions were reasonable
because “they are necessary to preserve its tradition of
amateurism, maintain competitive balance among FBS football
and Division I basketball teams, promote the integration of
academics and athletics, and increase the total output of its
product.” 158 Despite the NCAA’s use of its classic defenses, the
court ruled in favor of the student-athletes, finding that the
“challenged NCAA rules unreasonably restrain trade.” 159
O’Bannon is especially significant because the court
eviscerated each of the arguments presented by the NCAA. 160 The
court found the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism to be
inconsistent at best, 161 and went as far as to compare the practices
of the NCAA to those of a “cartel.” 162 The judge criticized the
testimony given by NCAA President, Mark Emmert, during trial.
In defense of NCAA rules and regulations, Emmert testified to the
importance of amateurism and stated that for over 100 years the
156 Id. The popular video game producer “EA Sports” was initially a named
defendant in this case as well, but prior to the recent decision, the company
chose to settle its portion of the claim for $40 million, and the case against the
NCAA continued. Tom Farrey, Players, Game Makers Settle for $40M,
ESPN.COM (May 31, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/
college-athletes-reach-40-million-settlement-ea-sports-ncaa-licensing-arm.
157 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963. Plaintiffs were seeking a permanent
injunction against the NCAA’s restrictions on compensation pertaining to the
use of student-athletes’ names and likenesses. Amanda Norris Ames, David B.
Hamilton & Jason C. Hicks, O’Bannon Decision Could Open the Door to
Significant Changes in Collegiate Athletics, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Sep.
5, 2014), www.natlawreview.com/article/o-bannon-decision-could-open-door-tosignificant-changes-collegiate-athletics.
158 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
159 Id. at 963.
160 Ames, Hamilton & Hicks, supra note 157.
161 Judge Wilken stated that certain NCAA theories pertaining to the
traditions of amateurism were simply “implausible.” Dan Wetzel, Why the
O'Bannon Victory is a Win for Everyone Who Stopped Believing the NCAA's
Charade, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2014, 1:49 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/
news/why-the-o-bannon-victory-is-a-win-for-everyone-who-stopped-believingthe-ncaascharade054938570.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter.
162 Ames, Hamilton & Hicks, supra note 157. Judge Wilken issued a
permanent injunction that prevents the NCAA from prohibiting “deferred
compensation in an amount of $5,000 per year or less for the licensing of
athletes’ names, images, and likenesses through a trust fund payable upon
expiration of athletic eligibility or graduation.” Id. The injunction also
prevented the NCAA from limiting athletic scholarships to any number that is
lower than the full cost of attendance. Id.
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amateurism rules have focused on making sure that studentathletes are provided with the resources they need to obtain an
education. 163
In dismissing Emmert’s argument, the court stated, “[t]he
historical evidence . . . demonstrates that the association’s
amateurism rules have not been nearly as consistent as Dr.
Emmert represents.” 164 To illustrate the historical inconsistency of
NCAA amateurism, the court pointed to the fact that the rules
have been modified numerous times in the last 100 years, 165 and
the current amateur rules blatantly violate bylaws of the past. 166
The court’s skepticism towards NCAA amateurism permeates
throughout the opinion.
The NCAA immediately filed an appeal of the district court’s
decision in O’Bannon. 167 The Ninth Circuit added to the growing
list of courts showing disdain for NCAA amateurism when it
affirmed the district court’s decision that the NCAA violated
antitrust laws by limiting student-athlete compensation related to
the NCAA’s use of their names, images, and likenesses. 168 While
the Ninth Circuit vacated the portion of the district court’s ruling
that would have allowed member-institutions to pay studentathletes up to $5,000 per year, it “affirmed the core of Judge
Wilken’s reasoning that the NCAA has been violating Section 1 of
the Sherman Act for years. 169
One of the most significant parts of the ruling was that the
Ninth Circuit rejected the NCAA’s assertion that any challenge
regarding the rules of amateurism – as opposed to the NCAA’s
commercial activity – must fail as a matter of law based on the
precedent established in Board of Regents. 170 The court stated that
“the NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts cannot and
must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the
Sherman Act’s rules.” 171 According to one leading commentator,
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
Id.
165 Since the bylaws were first enacted in 1906, there have been significant
changes to amateurism rules in 1916, 1922, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1975, 2004, and
2013. Id. at *43-46.
166 Id. at 973.
167 See generally Michael McCann, What the Appeals Court Ruling Means
for O’Bannon’s Ongoing NCAA Lawsuit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sep. 30, 2015)
[hereinafter
McCann
1],
www.si.com/college-basketball/2015/09/30/edobannon-ncaa-lawsuit-appeals-court-ruling
(discussing
the
O’Bannon
proceedings leading up to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling).
168 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015)[hereinafter
O’Bannon Appeal].
169 See McCann 1, supra note 167 (analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling).
170 See id. (stating that the Ninth Circuit rejected the NCAA’s use of Board
of Regents “to assert that challenges to amateurism rules must fail as a
matter of law”).
171 O’Bannon Appeal, 802 F.3d at 1079.
163
164
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“[t]his language is a setback for the NCAA since it makes the
NCAA more vulnerable to antitrust lawsuits, including those
brought by other student-athletes.” 172
Coupled with the other cases mentioned above, the O’Bannon
rulings clearly demonstrate that courts are no longer affording
deference to NCAA rules and regulations based on the traditions
of amateurism. This recent shift in treatment looms large as the
NCAA prepares for another round of antitrust challenges that are
pending in the courts. 173 Multiple lawsuits were recently filed
against the NCAA challenging NCAA rules that cap scholarship
limits at amounts well below the actual cost of attendance. 174 The
cases have been consolidated in federal court and are collectively
referred to as the “cost of attendance” cases. 175 The most important
of the pending cases is Jenkins v. NCAA 176 (hereinafter “the
Kessler Case”). 177 Simply put, it is the most brazen and direct
attack the NCAA has ever faced. 178
McCann 1, supra note 167.
See generally Bill Donahue, NCAA Ruling is a Game Changer,
Hausfiled Says, LAW360 (Aug. 11, 2014, 6:04 PM) www.law360.com/articles/
566161/ncaa-ruling-is-a-game-changer-hausfeld-says [hereinafter Donahue 1]
(stating that the O’Bannon ruling opens the door for successful challenges in
the future because the NCAA will not be able to rely on its classic antitrust
defenses).
174 See Andy Staples, O'Bannon just the beginning: Jenkins case could
unhinge NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 18, 2014),
www.si.com/college-football/2014/06/18/obannon-vs-ncaa-jenkins-markemmert-claudia-wilken (discussing the next round of antitrust challenges that
the NCAA will defend). “All those cases were filed in different parts of the
country, but the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated
them and placed them in the courtroom of Wilken.” Id.
175 In total, there are six independent claims that have been identified and
consolidated in front of Judge Claudia Wilken. Jon Solomon, Judge Draws
NCAA Doubleheader with O’Bannon, Scholarship Cases, CBS SPORTS, (June
17,
2014,
1:42
PM),
www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jonsolomon/24590912/judge-draws-ncaa-doubleheader-with-obannon-scholarshipcases.
176 Jenkins v. NCAA, 4:14-CV-02758 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
177 The case has become known as “the Kessler Case” because of the
attorney who filed the lawsuit. See Bill Donahue, In Latest NCAA Suit, a
Clearer Goal and Bigger Name, LAW360 (Mar. 18, 2014, 5:36 PM),
www.law360.com/articles/519716/in-latest-ncaa-suit-a-clearer-goal-and-biggername (discussing the background and past successes of attorney Jeffrey
Kessler); see also David J. Parnell, The NCAA’s ‘Cartel’ Activity has Awakened
a Sleeping Giant, FORBES, (Oct. 1, 2014, 8:46 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/
davidparnell/2014/05/08/the-ncaas-cartel-activity-has-awakened-a-sleepinggiant/2/,(stating that the NCAA has exploited athletes for long enough and
Jeffrey Kessler will be the attorney to solve the problem). Jeffrey Kessler is a
world-renowned labor law attorney who is best known for successfully
bringing free agency into the NFL. Id. Kessler’s list of impressive
accomplishments does not stop there. A small sampling of his wins includes:
successfully represented NFL players in a dispute over television contracts
used to fund the 2011 NFL lockout; successfully represented various NBA
players in multiple antitrust actions, which led to the current free
172
173

2015]

Judges Are Not ‘Super-Referees’

149

IV. ANALYZING THE FUTURE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS THROUGH THE KESSLER CASE
Using the O’Bannon decisions as a guide, the Kessler Case is
likely to destroy or, at the very least, significantly alter the
current NCAA model. This section discusses the ramifications that
a victory in the Kessler Case will have on the NCAA, and
intercollegiate athletics in general. Although sweeping reform of
the NCAA model is necessary, this section presents multiple
reasons why seeking such reform through an antitrust challenge
like the Kessler Case is not the ideal solution to the problems
presented within the unique world of big-time intercollegiate
athletics.

A. An Introduction to the Kessler Case
Rather than build its antitrust claim around theories in
intellectual property law, like O’Bannon and others, the Kessler
Case seeks a more direct route in its challenge. The case hopes to
bring a free-market system to college athletics by removing all
restrictions on student-athlete compensation. 179 Kessler contends
that no cap is legal in a free-market and the NCAA should be
permanently enjoined from restraining athlete compensation. 180
agency/salary cap in the NBA and the end of the 2011 NBA lockout;
successfully represented Oscar Pistorius, the double-amputee runner, in an
arbitration hearing that led to Pistorius competing against able-bodied
athletes in the Summer Olympics. Id.
178 See Staples, supra note 174 (stating that the Kessler Case is terrifying
to the NCAA because it seeks to “drop a bomb” on the business model for
college sports, and truly open the market for student-athletes). See generally
Steve Eder, A Legal Titan of Sports Labor Disputes Sets His Sights on the
NCAA,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
27,
2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/sports/jeffrey-kessler-envisions-open-market-forncaa-college-athletes.html (discussing what Jeffrey Kessler’s formidable
antitrust challenge to The NCAA’s compensation restrictions). It is worth
noting that the NCAA is not taking Kessler lightly; in response to the suit,
they have hired another world-renown labor law attorney, Jeffrey Mishkin, to
defend the organization. Id. Mishkin is a longtime adversary of Kessler’s and
has represented the NBA in every major dispute they have faced in the last 35
years. Id.
179 Staples, supra note 174.
180 Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014,
6:09
PM)
[hereinafter
Kessler
Files],
http://espn.go.com/espn/
print?id=10620388. According to Jeffrey Kessler, the NCAA and its memberinstitutions have “lost their way far down the road of commercialism, signing
multibillion dollar contracts wholly disconnected from the interests of
‘student-athletes’” Staples, supra note 176. The Kessler Case argues that
substantial damages have been inflicted upon the student-athletes whose
services have yielded riches to so many and this lawsuit is necessary to alter
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Kessler argues that “[i]n no other business, and college sports is
big business, would it ever be suggested that the people who are
providing the essential services work for free.” 181
Kessler’s free-market model would allow colleges to compete
for the services of student-athletes by offering anything from
enhanced scholarships to better medical care to, potentially, “lots
of cash.” 182 Kessler has stated, “[i]f you have a school like Texas
that earns close to $200 million [from] their football or basketball
programs, you might decide it is fair to give some of that to the
players who are generating the money.” 183 Essentially, the Kessler
Case is attempting to use the Sherman Act to bring “free agency”
to big-time college sports. 184

B. What if Kessler Is Victorious? Analyzing the Future of
Intercollegiate Athletics
Commentators have noted that a victory for the Kessler
Plaintiffs — which is likely 185 — would “certainly end all vestiges
of the amateurism model.” 186 At first glance, this may seem like
the ideal solution to the exploitive NCAA model, but a closer
analysis reveals that a free-market system – implemented through
the NCAA model, “which is inconsistent with the most fundamental principles
of antitrust law.” Id.
181 Kessler Files, supra note 180.
182 Eder, supra note 178.
183 Id. Under Kessler’s model,
A top high school basketball prospect could be recruited by colleges just as
the Cleveland Cavaliers courted LeBron James. There could be agents, and
money, and maybe even a salary cap down the road. The prospect could choose
where to go based on the coach, the facilities, the scholarship – or who was
offering the most money. The Players [will not] get one dollar more than the
markets decides they are worth. Id.
184 See IBJ, supra note 93 (stating that critics of the free-market model
have compared Kessler’s demands to “free-agency” in professional sports).
Former NCAA basketball great and current television analyst, Len Elmore,
says the consequences would be “earth-shattering.” Id.
185 When the case was consolidated with the other cost of attendance cases,
it was transferred to the Northern District of California and is set to be tried
in front of a woman who has suddenly become the most important person in
college athletics: Judge Claudia Wilken. See Solomon, supra note 175 (stating
that Judge Claudia Wilken’s importance to the future of college athletics is on
full display as she presides over both cases). In O’Bannon, Judge Wilken
analyzed and eviscerated the various rationales the NCAA has historically
used to defend itself from antitrust challenges. Joe Nocera, From Sneakers to
O’Bannon,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/opinion/joe-nocera-from-sneakers-toobannon.html?_r=0. Wilken is likely to apply the same reasoning to this case,
despite the differences between the two challenges. See generally Donahue 1,
supra note 167.
186 See Eder, supra note 178 (discussing the devastating results the NCAA
would face following a victory for the Kessler plaintiffs).
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antitrust litigation – is not the ideal solution for the unique issues
associated with the world of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
First, there are legitimate reasons why certain aspects of the
current system deserve to be saved. Second, implementing a freemarket system would create a plethora of legal and logistical
problems that would far outweigh the benefits of such a system.
1. Although the Current NCAA Model Exploits StudentAthletes, the Model Provides Certain Benefits That Are
Worth Protecting
While it is undeniable that the current NCAA model results
in the economic exploitation of student-athletes, this Comment
suggests that the entire NCAA model should not be destroyed
because there are beneficial aspects of the current system that
should be protected and preserved going forward. First, the
commercialization of college athletics is not inherently negative;
rather, this development can be used to provide major benefits for
colleges and universities as a whole. Second, despite the fact that a
small number of athletes face significant economic harm under the
current model, studies show that far more athletes receive longterm benefits from the existing amateur model.
a. The Commercialization of College Sports Can Provide
Legitimate Benefits for Colleges and Universities
The increasing commercialization of college sports is not an
inherently negative development. The higher education market is
increasingly competitive, and administrators at institutions of
higher learning understand that sports can serve as a catalyst to
achieving legitimate goals outside of the athletic department. 187
These administrators “are immersed in our society’s economic
climate” 188 and “use of intercollegiate sports” by these leaders is “a
rational response to marketplace realities.” 189 University and
athletic department administrators should be able to do what is
necessary for their institutions to compete successfully in a
competitive marketplace. 190
There are many recent examples of universities using bigtime college sports to benefit non-athletic components of their
Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 34, at 792. The success of
these institutions depends on a school’s ability to attract large incoming
classes of students, obtain and retain prominent faculty, enlarge fundraising
for brick and mortar, enhance and expand academic programs, and expand
endowments. Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 799.
190 Id. at 792.
187
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institutions. 191 In recent years, the University of Florida has won
National Championships in both football and men’s basketball. 192
Following the championships, application numbers rose
significantly and the school’s fundraising efforts increased 38
percent to $183 million. 193 The school allocated half of that money
to athletics and half to general university funds. 194 The school
recently launched an ambitious $1.5 billion fundraising campaign
that will undoubtedly benefit from the national notoriety
generated by its sports teams. 195
Critics are likely to argue that schools like Florida - large
institutions with massively popular and successful sports
programs - are the exception and not the norm, but there are also
examples of much smaller schools using athletics to benefit the
entire university. 196 For example, in 2007, the Boise State
University football team recorded an improbable win in one of the
biggest college football bowl games of the year by defeating the
heavily favored team from Oklahoma University. 197 Following the
game, the small school in Idaho received millions of dollars in new
pledges for its business and nursing schools, growth in a number
of its graduate school programs, merchandising contracts,
increases in alumni donations not solely directed towards
athletics, and boosts in local businesses as well. 198 School officials
believe that the school and community will benefit from this bowl
victory for years to come. 199
See id. at 793-97 (discussing the calculated efforts of many universities
to use athletics to boost enrollment, attract well-known professors and boost
general awareness for the university itself).
192 Id. at 793.
193 Id. at 793-94.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 794.
196 See id. at 794-97 (discussing how smaller schools such as Boise State
University, North Dakota State University, Georgia State University and the
University of Connecticut have strategically used their athletic departments
and athletic programs to foster growth within their respective universities).
197 Id. at 793.
198 Id.
199 Id. Even schools outside of Division I and big-time college athletics can
rely on intercollegiate athletics “as a means of revitalization or
transformation.” Id. at 797. Before 2005, Adrian College, a small liberal arts
school in Michigan, was struggling with “slumping enrollment and campus
malaise.” Id. The school decided to use athletics as a recruiting tool and was
able to completely turn things around. Id.
Since 2005, Adrian's enrollment has surged 57% to its highest number-1470--in twenty years, and the academic caliber of students has shot up.
Before 2005, Adrian had accepted 93% of its pool of 1200 applicants. Since
adopting its athletics-based student recruiting strategy, Adrian now accepts
only 72% of the applicants from a nearly fourfold larger pool of 4200
applications and reports that its student body has better academic credentials.
Id.
191
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As the previous stories illustrate, the commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics is not inherently negative. School
administrators should be allowed to use the benefits of the
commercialized world of intercollegiate athletics to benefit the
entirety of their respective institutions. Destroying the current
model will not allow them to do so.
b. Many More Student-Athletes Benefit from the Current
Model than Are Harmed by It
While reform of the current NCAA model is long over due, the
entire NCAA system should not be destroyed because the majority
of student-athletes actually benefit from the current rules. Seeking
reform through the implementation of a free-market system will
harm more student-athletes than it benefits. 200 It is estimated that
the top 1 percent of student-athletes generate 90 percent of
revenues in big-time college sports. 201 And while a draft-quality
football or basketball player earns his school anywhere from
$406,000 to $1.194 million annually, 202 the economic value of most
players, in a free-market system, would be far less than the value
of the scholarship they currently receive. 203 If a free-market
system is implemented, the inevitable will occur: schools will start
paying the majority of football and basketball players less, in order
to pay the large salaries commanded by a handful of star players.
This will prove harmful because the current system provides
a large number of student-athletes with “the opportunity to
leverage their athletic abilities into academic achievement that
might otherwise be unavailable to them.” 204 If most of the studentathletes on a football team, for example, will be worth less on the
open market than the value of their current scholarship, this
would lead to less student-athletes going to college and receiving
the life-long benefits associated with obtaining a degree.
Studies show the significant academic and future career
benefits that participation in intercollegiate athletics provides. 205
A study conducted by the NCAA in 2007 revealed:

200 See Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 865 (discussing the likely outcome
of paying the small number of student-athletes that would be worth large
sums of money to colleges and universities).
201 Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 7,
2011), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports/308643/?single_page=true.
202 Robert John Givens, “Capitamateuralism”: An Examination of the
Economic Exploitation of Student-Athletes by the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 82 UNIV. MO. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 205, 211 (2013).
203 Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 865.
204 Id. at 854.
205 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 34, at 801.
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that (1) 88% of student-athletes earn their baccalaureate degrees,
compared to less than 25% of the American adult population; (2)
91% of former Division I student-athletes are employed full-time,
11% more than the general population, and average higher income
levels than non-student-athletes; (3) 89% of former student-athletes
believe the skills and values learned from participating in
intercollegiate athletics helped them obtain their current
employment in a career other than playing professional sports; and
(4) 27% of former Division I student-athletes earn a postgraduate
degree. 206

These numbers are compounded by the fact that almost every
single college athlete will pursue a career in something other than
sports. 207 Statistics show that only 1.2 percent of men’s basketball
players, and 1.6 percent of football players will play professionally
on any level. 208 The economic exploitation of a relatively minute
percentage of student-athletes does not justify the destruction of
the entire system; especially when considering that the 1 percent
of athletes that generate most of the revenues are likely to be in
the 1.2 percent to 1.6 percent of student-athletes that will go on to
play professionally in their respective sports. 209
2. Implementing a Free-Market System through the
Sherman Act Would Create More Problems than it Would
Fix
Implementing a free-market system through an antitrust
challenge would present numerous legal and logistical problems
that far outweigh any of the system’s benefits. If a free-market
system were implemented, the NCAA and its member-institutions
would be faced with multiple legal issues, such as tax liability, 210

Id.
Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 34, at 839. (discussing the low
likelihood of NCAA student-athletes playing professional sports).
208
Probability
of
Competing
beyond
High
School,
NCAA
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-highschool (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
209 See Branch, supra note 201 (explaining that the top 1 percent of
student-athletes generate most of the revenues within college sports).
210 A brief look into the tax implications of allowing student-athletes to
offer their services in a free-market system demonstrates some of the
difficulties of paying student-athletes. Under current law, an athlete who
receives a scholarship only has taxable income to the extent such scholarship
exceeds the cost of tuition, books, and fees. Lorry Spitzer et al., Game On!
Recent Legal Developments and Tax Issues for College Athletics, ROPES &
GRAY
LLP
(Sept.
15,
2014),
www.ropesgray.com/news-andinsights/Insights/2014/September/Game-On-Recent-Legal-Developments-andTax-Issues-for-Collegiate-Athletics.aspx. Since NCAA rules limit athletic
scholarships to an amount several thousand dollars less than the cost of
attendance, this is currently not an issue in collegiate sports. Id. The decision
206
207
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labor law issues, 211 workers’ compensation issues, 212 and Title IX
violations, 213 among others.
For example, if a free-market system were put in place, the
NCAA and its individual member-institutions would face a deluge
of future lawsuits under Title IX. Essentially, Title IX forbids
discrimination on the basis of sex within higher education. 214 The
law was implemented at a time when the landscape of college
sports was radically different. 215 Title IX, as it has been applied to
intercollegiate athletics, means that any opportunity that is
available for male athletes must also be available for female
athletes. 216 Commentators have stated that the laws of Title IX
“would presumably prohibit extreme disparities between women’s
and men’s sports programs.” 217 Since few institutions have
women’s teams in any sport that generate significant revenue, 218 it
stands to reason that men’s football players and basketball players
would receive significant income in a free-market system, while
female athletes will not.
in O’Bannon, which allowed athletes to receive “deferred compensation,” could
lead to at least two negative results. Id.
First, it would change the current rules on reporting scholarships, which
would result in “increased compliance and reporting burdens for both students
and schools.” Id. Second, the Tax Code has provisions that come into play
when a tax-exempt organization, such as the NCAA, creates a deferred
compensation program. Id. It is likely that even though the money would be in
a trust that the athlete could not access until graduation or the expiration of
eligibility, that the money would be taxable during each tax year that it was
received. Id.
211 See generally Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible
Labor Market: College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 1077 (2012) (discussing, from a labor law perspective, the legal
implications of compensating student-athletes).
212 See generally Michael J. Mondello & Joseph Beckham, Workers’
Compensation and College Athletes: the Debate over the Pay for Play Model: A
Counterpoint, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 293 (2002)(analyzing whether workers’
compensation benefits should be provided for student-athletes participating in
intercollegiate athletics).
213 See Marot, supra note 52 (stating that if men’s basketball and football
players begin to receive compensation for competing, then female athletes
would argue the existence of Title IX violations).
214 Michael McCann, Ed O'Bannon v. the NCAA: A complete analysis before
the trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 6, 2014) [hereinafter McCann 2],
www.si.com/college-football/2014/06/05/ed-obannon-ncaa-trial-primer.
215 Id.
216 See Jill Lieber Steeg, Lawsuits, Disputes Reflect Continuing Tension
Over
Title
IX,
USA
TODAY
(May
13,
2008,
1:59
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-05-12-titleix-cover_N.htm
(stating that “Title IX has come to stand for equality in college sports, though
it applies to all schools receiving federal funds, not just colleges, and not just
to athletics”).
217 Harvard, supra note 43, at 1317.
218 See Smith 1, supra note 10, at 20 (discussing Title IX and its application
to intercollegiate athletics over the last few decades).

156

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:125

It is not certain that the NCAA would lose Title IX challenges
if a free-market system were implemented and student-athletes
were compensated. 219 Title IX is based on providing equal
opportunities for male and female athletes; thus, the fact that
certain male athletes participate in revenue generating sports and
would command more compensation, might not trigger Title IX
violations because women are still being provided similar
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics. 220
Regardless of the outcome, any Title IX issues would only be
sorted out through complex, future litigation that will cost all
parties, including the courts, vast amounts of time and
resources. 221 The same can be said for the other legal questions
that would arise regarding tax law, employment law, and others.
In addition to the legal problems, paying student-athletes in a
free-market system would also create overwhelming logistical
problems for the NCAA and its member-institutions. 222 If schools
were required to compensate student-athletes, the first issue
would be determining where the additional money would come
from. 223 Under the current system, only a small fraction of
Division I football and basketball programs claim that their
athletic departments produce any profits. 224 Therefore, most
programs argue that they simply cannot afford to compensate
student-athletes beyond the scholarship amounts currently
provided. 225 Critics claim that the money to pay student-athletes is
there, but it is being spent on lavish facilities and high coaching
salaries instead. 226 Additional evidence suggests that many
athletic departments actually do produce profits for their

See Jon Solomon, If Football, Men’s Basketball Players Get Paid, What
About Women?, CBS SPORTS (June 5, 2014, 9:52 AM), www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24581041/if-football-mens-basketballplayers-get-paid-what-about-women [hereinafter Solomon Title IX] (stating
that some legal experts predict large Title IX implications if athletes receive
compensation, while other experts believe it will be a non-issue).
220 Id.
221 See generally McCann 2, supra note 214 (discussing potential title IX
problems associated with paying student-athletes and stating that any issues
will be sorted out through litigation).
222 See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint: Paying
College Athletes, THE SPORT JOURNAL (June 15, 2012), available at
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-paying-college-athletes/
(discussing the issues that would arise if schools were to pay student-athletes).
223 Kristi Dosh, The Problems with Paying College Athletes, FORBES (June
9, 2011. 6:34 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/theproblems-with-paying-college-athletes/2/.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See generally Petchesky, supra note 84.
219
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respective universities, but these revenues are hidden through the
use creative accounting practices. 227
Even if these arguments are valid, and the money to pay
student-athletes does exist, many practical issues would need to be
considered. 228 “How do [schools] decide which athletes are paid? Is
it just in revenue-producing sports? Is it every athlete playing in
those sports or just the elite?” 229 Schools would also have to decide
how much to pay student-athletes. Would it be “one set amount for
every athlete no matter the sport or the school?” 230 Would
compensation be performance based? 231 How would injury and
other factors affect compensation? 232
Regardless of how these questions are answered, it is likely
that student-athletes in non-revenue generating sports will be the
ones to suffer. 233 One commentator addressing these problems has
stated that “[t]he outcome here would be inevitable: Forcing
athletic departments to pay its football and basketball players
would result in the eventual elimination of most, if not all, of the
non-revenue sports.” 234 As mentioned above, this would prevent
countless student-athletes from obtaining college degrees – and
the life-long benefits associated with them. 235
The myriad legal and logistical complications that will
inevitably arise with a victory in the Kessler case point to a much
larger issue: attempting to reform the NCAA through the use of
the “Sherman Act is an ill-fitting solution” to the unique problems
associated with the world of big-time intercollegiate athletics. 236
This is because “[t]he Sherman Act was primarily designed to
focus on for-profit commercial enterprises . . . [and] antitrust law
is not well-suited for case-by-case judicial application” to an
industry like the NCAA, where non-economic factors – i.e., the
preservation of amateurism – must be balanced against the
anticompetitive economic effects of the restraints. 237 Analysts have
227 See id. (arguing that the money to pay student-athletes exists, and that
athletic departments “tweak their balance sheets to show loss even though
[they are] actually turning a nice profit”).
228 See Dosh, supra note 223 (presenting a variety of issues that would
arise if student-athletes were compensated by their respective schools).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Johnson & Acquaviva, supra note 222.
232 Id.
233 See id. (stating that most sports do not generate revenues for their
schools, and would likely be eliminated so schools can pay star players from
revenue generating sports); Dosh, supra note 223 (stating that non-revenue
generating men’s sports will suffer if schools start compensating other
student-athletes).
234 Johnson & Acquaviva, supra note 222.
235 Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 865-66.
236 See id. at 861 (providing five reasons why the use of the Sherman Act is
not the best solution to the problems of the NCAA).
237 Id. See also Gabe Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust
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noted that “[t]he promotion of amateurism, or any other social
goals, has no place in the [rule of reason analysis] and has no
impact on the legality of a restraint.” 238 Forcing judges to
incorporate social goals into their antitrust analysis “sets [them]
up for failure[,]” and has resulted in a “wildly diverse and
incoherent application of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s studentathlete restrictions.” 239 Furthermore, other commentators have
noted that “a piecemeal approach by way of antitrust litigation
that merely considers the legality of the particular challenged
restraint will not effectively solve systemic problems inherent in
the production of commercialized intercollegiate athletics by
institutions of higher education.” 240

V.

Proposal

Immediate reform of the NCAA model is needed because the
system has developed into a scheme that primarily serves the
needs of universities and other “high-stakes players” without
protecting the needs of student-athletes. 241 And, essentially, under
the current system, “amateurism” is nothing more than a term
used by the NCAA to designate its business model. 242 The system
needs to change so that the needs of the student-athletes are once
again of primary importance. And while there will undoubtedly be
complex logistical problems and growing pains associated with the
implementation of any type of reform, 243 it is clear that using the
Sherman Act to attack the NCAA and implement a free-market
system is not the answer.
Thus, this Comment proposes that Congress enact an
alternative regulatory scheme that would force the NCAA to
engage in meaningful economic and academic reform. 244 In return
Beast, 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 249, 257 (2014) (stating that balancing non-economic,
social factors against economic factors is “anathema to antitrust law”).
238 Feldman, supra note 237, at 257.
239 Id.
240 Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 867.
241 Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes,
and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic
Regulation, WIS. L. REV. 545, 548 (1995).
242 Karcher, supra note 104, at 49.
243 Kavitha A. Davidson, Today Let’s Blow up the NCAA, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Aug. 7, 2014, 8:45 AM), www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-07/todaylet-s-blow-up-the-ncaa (discussing and analyzing the NCAA Board of
Directors’ decision to grant more autonomy to the “Power Five” athletic
conferences). It is argued that more autonomy for the larger conferences and
schools will lead to a larger void between the “haves and have-nots” of college
athletics. Id. There will likely be infighting and conflicting interests blocking
progress of NCAA reform no matter what is decided, but at this point “any
action against the NCAA is a good action.” Id.
244 See John Infante, Drake Group Proposes Sweeping Federal Regulation
of NCAA ATHNET(Oct. 11, 2013, 3:33 PM), www.athleticscholarships.net/
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for complying with the new regulatory rules, the NCAA and its
member-institutions will be provided with a strictly enforced,
qualified exemption to the antitrust laws of the Sherman Act. 245
This exemption will force the NCAA into meaningful reform but
allow the NCAA to keep certain rules and regulations in place that
might otherwise leave the organization vulnerable to antitrust
attacks. 246
Congressional intervention is necessary because the NCAA
has demonstrated its unwillingness to implement reform on its
own, and shifting judicial treatment indicates that it is only a
matter of time before the NCAA is destroyed through antitrust
litigation. However, as discussed above, this would not be the ideal
solution to the unique problems associated with the world of bigtime intercollegiate athletics, and would create more problems
than it would remedy.
The key component to the Reform Legislation will be the
creation of an independent organization to monitor and oversee
the operations of the NCAA. 247 Independent oversight is required
because there is simply too much money involved to expect the
self-interested NCAA to implement meaningful reform on its own
accord. 248 The NCAA Reform Committee (“the Committee”) would
2013/10/11/drake-group-proposes-sweeping-federal-regulation-of-ncaa.htm
(stating that the NCAA is caught in the middle of arguments from the “payfor-play” advocates on one side, and academic reform advocates on the other).
The Drake Group is an NCAA reform group that is currently drafting a
similar proposal aimed at creating a federally regulated scheme for NCAA
athletics. Id.
This Comment’s proposal has certain aspects that mirror the Drake
Group’s proposal, but also differs on several factors. This proposal is similar in
that it does not advocate for any “pay-for-play” system at all. See generally id.
Under this model, certain “likeness” rules will be modified and relaxed to
allow athletes to reap some economic benefits, but no NCAA student-athletes,
in any sport, will receive a salary or additional compensation of any kind
directly from their college or university. Id. This will allow the NCAA and
student-athletes to avoid the complex legal issues that would arise through
the implementation of a free-market system sought by Kessler.
One of the differences in the proposals is that Drake Group does not ask
for the creation of an independent regulatory committee. Id. Instead, they call
for an overhaul of the current NCAA Board of Directors that provide equal
representation by school presidents from all three Divisions of intercollegiate
athletics. Id. This is likely to be ineffective, as the NCAA has had ample
opportunity to reform the system on its own and has failed to do so. There is
simply too much money involved in intercollegiate athletics to expect the selfinterested NCAA to voluntarily change the way it does business. C. Thomas
McMillen, Accountability on the Quad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2011, at A29.
245 See Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 874-75. (arguing that the NCAA
should be given a legislative exemption to the rules of the Sherman Act).
246 Id. at 875.
247 See id. at 867-70 (proposing that federal regulation through external,
independent review is a better solution to the current problems associated
with the NCAA’s current amateur model).
248 McMillen, supra note 245.
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be a “quasi-governmental regulatory organization” similar to those
used to monitor financial markets. 249 The Committee should model
its structure after the National Futures Association (“NFA”),
which monitors and regulates activities associated with futures
trading. 250 The purpose of the Committee will be to ensure
compliance with the regulatory scheme, while leaving the NCAA
to do what it does best: organize and oversee the implementation
of athletic events and championships. 251
The Committee will have the authority to develop and enforce
rules, provide programs and services that safeguard the integrity
of intercollegiate athletics, protect student athletes from
exploitation, and provide member institutions with the tools and
resources necessary to meet their regulatory requirements. 252
While compliance with the Committee’s rules will not be
mandatory, any institution that wishes to host Division I athletics
“Federal financial regulators rely heavily on quasi-governmental
regulatory organizations (QGROs) . . . to complement their rulemaking and
examination efforts.” Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial
Regulators, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 569, 601 (2013).
QGROs vary in their statutory bases, form of governance, and degree to
which they are overseen by one or more federal financial regulators. Most
QGROs exert considerable control within their areas of delegated authority.
QGROs often serve as the frontline regulators, directly regulating the firms
and individuals that deal with the public. The rules adopted by QGROs are of
critical importance to the firms they regulate, the customers of those firms,
and the structure of our financial markets.
Id.
250
See
Who
We
Are,
NATIONAL
FUTURES
ASSOCIATION,
www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-about-nfa/index.HTML (last visited Nov. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter NFA] (stating that the “National Futures Association (NFA) is the
self-regulatory organization for the U.S. derivatives industry”). The NFA
oversees and protects investors from fraudulent commodities and futures
activities. Id. The NFA is a non-profit, independent regulatory organization.
Id. The organization does not operate or implement any trading markets or
trade associations. Id. The sole responsibility of the organization is to regulate
futures trading and protect fraudulent activities. Id. The NFA operates at no
cost to taxpayers and is financed exclusively from membership dues and
assessment fees. Id.
251 See John Infante, NCAA Miami Problems Show Need for Federal
Takeover,
ATHNET
(Jan.
23,
2013,
1:30
PM),
www.athleticscholarships.net/2013/01/23/ncaa-federal-takeover.htm
[hereinafter Federal Takeover] (proposing the commission of a federal
regulatory body that would enforce rules in intercollegiate athletics while
leaving the NCAA to implement the sporting events and championships). The
proposal presented by Infante differs from this proposal because it would be a
fully controlled governmental agency under the Department of Education. Id.
Full reliance on government funding and support is not ideal for an
organization like this because intercollegiate sports might become “a political
football” with funding for athletics being used as a “bargaining chip.” Id.
252 These fundamental elements of the Committee mirror the language
provided on the NFA website describing that organizations functions. See
NFA, supra note 250 (providing information on how the NFA is structured and
what the organization has the power and authority to accomplish).
249
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will have to be a Committee “member” and adhere to the same
high standards as every other institution. Only schools that spend
a certain amount of money each year on intercollegiate athletics
will be required to comply with the rules. 253 Any institution that
decides not to adopt the Committee’s rules will not receive the
benefits of the antitrust exemption. 254
The Committee will not impose any tax burdens on citizens
because it will be completely self-sufficient, just like the NFA. 255
The NCAA and its member-institutions will support the operation
of the Committee through membership dues and assessments. 256
Like the NFA, the Committee will require that any complaints
brought under the new system be resolved through mediation and
binding arbitration. 257 Mandatory arbitration provides for the
efficient and cost-effective resolution of disputes, 258 while
simultaneously removing the burden on judges to apply complex
legal doctrines to the unique world of intercollegiate athletics. 259
While the new regulatory structure under the NCAA Reform
Committee will remain flexible and dynamic to allow for change in
the future, it is proposed that the following provisions be included
in the original reform legislation enacted by Congress:

A. Strict Reporting and Accounting Standards for the
NCAA and its Member-Institutions
To effectively regulate and enforce reform, the Committee
must have accurate financial information about each institution,
and the current system simply cannot produce such
253 See Federal Takeover, supra note 251 (proposing various options that
would force NCAA member institutions to comply with a federal regulatory
scheme). Division I schools that do not want to participate will have to cut
spending and drop to a lower level. Id. Conversely, smaller schools would have
to make a more informed decision when deciding to jump up to Division I. Id.
254 Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 874-75.
255 See generally NFA, supra note 250 (explaining the structure of the
NFA).
256 See Id. (explaining that the NFA is “financed exclusively from
membership dues and assessment fees”).
257
Dispute
Resolution,
NATIONAL
FUTURES
ASSOCIATION,
www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-about-nfa/who-we-are/dispute-resolution.HTML
(last visited, Nov. 14, 2014).
258 See Mitten & Ross, supra note 12, at 876 (suggesting that arbitration
would benefit NCAA challenges by ensuring that complaints get resolved
within 45 days).
259 See id. at 867 (stating that the Sherman Act is ill-equipped to handle
the “systemic problems inherent in the production of commercialized
intercollegiate athletics”). There are rules and agreements within
intercollegiate athletics, which “define this unique brand of athletic
competition” and courts are not in the best position to determine the
“permissible scope of a university’s relationship with its student-athletes.” Id.
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information. 260 Under the current reporting set-up, universities
are required to report data regarding 15 categories of their annual
operating revenues and 19 categories of operating expenses. 261 The
problem is that there are no standard reporting metrics, so schools
report numbers that make it incredibly difficult to determine
whether or not its athletic department operates at a profit or
loss. 262
Essentially, the unique world of big-time college sports has
created dysfunctional economic practices because the NCAA and
its member-institutions produce billions of dollars in revenues but
operate in a “not-for-profit accounting world.” 263 It is difficult to
analyze the economics of intercollegiate sports because “[e]ven
within a single athletic conference, accounting methods are so
varied that comparing any single financial item is a challenge.” 264
Many athletic departments that claim to operate at a loss would
easily turn a profit if revenues or expenses were counted
differently. 265
For example, the University of Tennessee’s athletic
department reported taking over $12 million in subsidies from the
university to operate its athletic programs in 2013. 266 The number
See generally Petchesky, supra note 84; Steve Berkowitz, A Proposal for
Better Balance Sheets Among NCAA Members, USA TODAY (June 18, 2013,
9:46 PM) [hereinafter Berkowitz 2], www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/
2013/06/18/ncaa-athletic-subsidies-accounting-changes/2435527/; Jason Kirk,
College Athletic Departments Aren’t Necessarily as Broke as You Think,
SBNATION (June 6, 2014, 9:00 AM), www.sbnation.com/collegefootball/2014/6/6/5783394/college-sports-profits-money-schools-revenuessubsidies (providing examples of the various ways schools can manipulate
accounting practices to skew the true financial viability of intercollegiate
athletics).
261 Berkowitz 2, supra note 260.
262 Id.
263 See Brian Goff, NCAA “Arms Race” Metaphor Gets the Economics
Backwards, FORBES (July 30, 2014, 10:40 AM), www.forbes.com/
sites/briangoff/2014/07/30/ncaa-arms-race-metaphor-gets-the-economicsbackwards/ (analyzing the accounting practices of big-time athletic
departments and stating that traditional measurements of profitability and
sustainability are inadequate because schools have no incentive to grow
surpluses that can be extracted as profits).
264 Kirk, supra note 260.
265 Id. Much of the confusion arises out of the complications with defining
the word “subsidy.” Id. Under the current NCAA system, almost every athletic
department in the country has taken a “subsidy” from elsewhere in order to
“stay afloat.” Id. “Only seven, of the 230 listed public schools are shown as
having no subsidy money in 2013.” Id. Currently, the NCAA considers as
subsidy any revenue generated by an athletic department that comes from
student-fees, any state support, and either of two types of university support:
direct financial support; and the use of tuition waivers. Berkowitz 2, supra
note 260.
266 Kirk, supra note 260. The athletic department takes the subsidies
despite having a 100,000-seat football stadium and a lucrative SEC television
contract. Id.
260
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is misleading because the majority of it is “money that has never
actually existed.” 267 A closer examination of the athletic
department’s budget turns the $12 million loss into a gain of
almost $6 million. 268 The athletic department “created” the losses
by counting an $8 million depreciation in the value of its
basketball arena as an expense and by sending more than $6
million in revenue directly to the university – to cover the money
the school lost by giving the student-athletes scholarships – and
counting it as an expense. 269 Misleading accounting tricks like this
are nothing new, 270 and are common practice even within the
wealthiest athletic departments. 271
Many athletic departments are not being malicious when
“fudging the numbers.” 272 Because they are “attached to non-profit
universities, athletic departments face little pressure to show a
profit or even to have precise bookkeeping, and ‘[it is] simply timeconsuming to try and parse out true sources of revenues or
expenses.’" 273 Regardless of athletic departments’ motives or
financial conditions, 274 no meaningful analysis or reform can be
implemented until each institution is required to abide by a set of
uniform accounting standards. This standardization of accounting
practices will also enable the Committee to identify and prevent
wasteful spending within athletic departments, thus providing
additional revenue for student-athletes. 275

Id.
Id.
269 Id. These are standard practices at most universities that operate bigtime college sports. Id. The practices allow athletic departments to “hide their
profits” to keep them away from the student-athletes and other claimants,
while looking viable enough that critics won’t use “sports’ apparent poverty to
strip them of power.” Id.
270 The results of a famous study from 1992 showed that while the athletic
department at Western Kentucky was claiming to operate at a $1.5 million
yearly loss, they were actually generating around $5 million in profits
annually but hiding the money using “creative accounting practices.”
Petchesky, supra note 84.
271 The University of Texas’ athletic department – the wealthiest college
athletic department in existence – counts every full athletic scholarships it
grants in every sport as “out-of-state” tuition, whether the athlete is from
Texas or not, “in an obvious attempt to falsely increase expenses.” Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 The University of Rutgers’ athletic department took $47 million from
the public university in order to operate its athletic programs. Keith Sargeant
& Steve Berkowitz, Subsidy of Rutgers Athletics Jumps 67.9% to $47 Million,
USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2014, 10:32 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/college/2014/02/23/rutgers-university-athletics-subsidy-jumps/5761371/.
275 See Dennie, supra note 9, at 49 (stating that the arguments about the
inability of athletic departments to generate net revenues fails to consider that
the reason there is no money is because it is all being mismanaged and spent
on everything other than the student-athletes).
267
268
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B. Caps on Coaching Salaries and Other Expenditures
Spending limits need to be imposed to prevent the gross
mismanagement of athletic department funds that occurs under
the current model. 276 One way to curb spending would be to cap
the salaries for head coaches. Some have argued that salaries for
coaches and top administrators should be capped at a level two
times what top professors in the country make. 277 While any
decision to limit pay for coaches will undoubtedly be met with
staunch resistance, doing so would put academics and athletics on
a more level playing field within NCAA member-institutions and
be a huge step towards implementing the academic reform
mentioned above. Furthermore, capping coaches’ salaries would
provide another source of money for athletic departments to
provide the necessary increases in scholarship dollars for studentathletes. 278

C. Require Bonus Money to be Strictly Monitored and
Allocated
Athletic Conferences and the institutions that comprise them
receive large bonuses for participating in certain NCAA
tournaments and games. Under the current model, there are no
restrictions on what this money can be used for. Schools should be
forced to funnel portions of that money into general trusts for the
athletes. At the very least, conferences and schools should be
required to report exactly where their money is going and how it is
being used.

D. Mandatory Healthcare for All Student-Athletes
The current model does not require the NCAA or its memberinstitutions to provide medical care or health insurance for sportsrelated injuries. 279 The Committee will implement rules
guaranteeing such benefits. Additionally, the NCAA will be
required to implement benefit programs that provide support for
student-athletes who suffer documented, long-term injuries
related to their participation in college sports. 280
276 See generally Daniel Hare, How to Curb Spending in College Athletics,
THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE SPORTS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://
businessofcollegesports.com/2013/03/14/how-to-curb-spending-in-collegeathletics/ (arguing for the implementation of yearly spending limits within
intercollegiate athletics).
277 Infante, supra note 244.
278 Dennie, supra note 9, at 49.
279 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 34, at 840.
280 This issue has gained traction lately, as the negative long-term health
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the NCAA and big-time college sports have evolved into
multibillion-dollar industries, the NCAA has stubbornly clung to
its antiquated “principles of amateurism” in an effort to maintain
the lucrative status quo. In doing so, the NCAA, ironically, has
become the group most responsible for the exploitation of student
athletes. 281
The proposed NCAA Reform Legislation would allow for the
implementation of actual, meaningful reform in intercollegiate
athletics, while avoiding the complex legal and logistical problems
mentioned above. Congressional intervention is required because
the NCAA has demonstrated its unwillingness to implement any
reform on its own and, as time goes on, the judiciary seems more
willing to reprimand the NCAA under the ill-suited antitrust laws
of the Sherman Act.

effects of playing college sports, particularly football, have been called into
question. See NCAA reaches Proposed Settlement in Concussion Lawsuit,
NCAA (Jul. 29, 2014, 8:47 AM) www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/press-releases/ncaa-reaches-proposed-settlement-concussion-lawsuit
(discussing the proposed settlement in several consolidated concussion-related
class action lawsuits).
Under the proposed settlement agreement, all current and former NCAA
student-athletes in all sports and divisions who competed at an NCAA
member school within the past fifty years may qualify for physical
examination, neurological measurements and neurocognitive assessments.
The agreement covers academic accommodations for student-athletes with
concussions, return-to-play guidelines, educational programs, research and
plaintiffs’ attorney fees. Bodily injury claims are not part of this settlement.
Id.
281 Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, Regulate, Don't Litigate, Change in
College
Sports,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(June
10,
2014),
www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/06/10/college-sports-would-be-betterreformed-through-federal-regulation-lawsuits-essay. See also Edelman, supra
note 13, at 1031 (stating that as revenues soar, the benefits are passed along
to NCAA officers, college administrators, and coaches instead of the studentathletes).
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